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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 





MARION D. CARLTON, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Brief of Appellant 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This appeal is taken from an Order (R. 43-44) of 
the trial court modifying a decree of divorce. 
The action arose by the issuance of an Order to 
Show Cause (R. 13) on behalf of the Respondent, 
.:\[arion D. Carlton, and against the Appellant, F. H. 
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Carlton, who were the defendant and plaintiff respec-
tively in a divorce action, the Decree (R. 8-9) of which 
vi· as entered the 24th day of June, 1954, by the Third 
,Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah. The default of the defendant was based 
upon her Waiver and Entry of Appearance (R. 4) 
therein. 
By the terms of the Decree of Divorce (R. 8), Ap-
pellant was to pay Respondent $150.00 per month, repre-
senting $30.00 support money for each of four children 
and $30.00 alimony. During the period of approximately 
thirteen months between the date of divorce and the date 
of hearing of the Order to Show Cause, the Appellant 
had paid the support and alimony designated under the 
Decree regularly and had in addition made other pay-
n1ents on behalf of the Respondent, including payments 
on the mortgage of the home occupied by Respondent. 
The Respondent filed her Petition for ~Modification 
of Decree (R. 10-11-12) on the 22nd day of July, 1955, 
in which she alleged: (1) that since the divorce she had 
discovered that the equity in the home of the parties at 
2737 Morningside Drive in Salt Lake City, Utah, was 
not more than $500.00, rather than $5,000.00 as alleged 
in the complaint; (2) that Appellant in addition to pay-
ing the support and alimony as required by the Decree 
had paid the house payments, and that with Appellant 
paying thus Respondent was still unable to support her-
self and the minor children without working outside thr 
home; (3) that Appellant had now refused to continue 
to make said house payments and that it would be im-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
~- possible for her to support herself and the minor children 
~~~ and make the house payments; ( 4) that Respondent dis-
im <·on'rrd since thP divorce Decree was entered that _Ap-
tcy, pellant is earning and capable of earning in excess of 
~ $7,500.00 per year, and that Appellant had concealed 
l) from Respondent substantial sums of money which Ap-
pellant had saved and deposited in local banks and 
l~ savings associations, and that it would be for the best interest of the children for Respondent to cease her 
employment and remain at home with her minor chil-
dren. Respondent from the foregoing prayed the court 
to modify the original Decree of divorce to require 
Appellant to pa~' $70.00 per month for each child and 
$100.00 per month to Respondent as alimony. 
Based upon the Petition of the Respondent, thP 
court issued an Order to Show Cause (R. 13) which '"a~ 
duly served upon the Appellant (R. 14). 
Appellant thereupon filed his Motion to Dismiss 
Order to Show Cause (R. 17) supported by his Affidavit 
in Support of Motion to Dismiss Order to Show Cause 
(R. 15-16). Appellant's :\fotion to Dismiss Order to 
Show Cause (R. 17) contended that the Affidavit or 
Petition for Modification (R. 10-11-12) filed hy the 
Respondent to support the Order to Show Cause did 
not allege a change of circumstance or condition occur-
ring since the date of the divorce. 
Appellant'~ ~fotion to DismisR Order to ~how< 1 Hll~P 
(R. 17) was argued before the conrt on August 1, 1955, 
and the court dismissed the ~lotion and in so doing 
stated, ''There isn't an allegation of specific fraud, but 
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I think in substance there is a showing from which fraud 
might he inferred" {R. 19). 
r.rhereafter the Order to Show Cause was heard and 
the court thereafter entered its Order (R. 43-44), from 
which Order this appeal is taken. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED ON 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING AP-
PELLANT'S :MOTION TO DISMISS ORDER TO 
SHOW CAUSE SINCE RESPONDENT'S PETITION 
FOR MODIFICATION OF DECREE DOES NOT 
STATE OR ALLEGE A SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE 
OF CIRCUMSTANCES SINCE THE GRANTING OF 
rrHFJ DIVORCE DECREE. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING A 
:MODIFICATION OF THE DECREE OF DIVORCE 
SINCE THE EVIDENCE TAKEN AT THE HEAR-
ING OF THE ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE DID NOT 
ESTABLISH A MA1,ERIAL, SUBSTANTIAL OR 
PER1\1ANENT CHANGE OF CIRCUl\1:STANCES 
SINCE THE DATE OF THE DECREE. 
POINT III 
rrHE rrRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO 
~lAJ{E ANY FINDINGS OF FACT UPON WHICH 
IT BASED ITS ORDER 1\1:0DIFYING THE DE-
CREE OF DIVORCE. 
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IU~ ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING AP-
PELLANT'S l\IOTION TO DISMISS ORDER TO 
RHOW CAUSE SINCE RESPONDENT'S PETITION 
FOR I\IODIFICATION OF DECREE DOES NOT 
STATE OR ALLEGE A SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE 
OF CIRCUl\fSTANCES SINCE THE GRANTING OF 
THE DIVORCE DECREE. 
The Petition for l\fodification of Decree (R. 10-11-
12) filed in the court below by Respondent did not allege 
any facts showing a material, substantial or permanent 
change of conditions from those which existed at the 
time of the entry of the original Decree. 
Respondent's Petition does not in any particular 
point out any change of circumstances of the parties 
from the date of the divorce Decree to the date of the 
Order to Show Cause. The closest the Respondent 
comes to such is an allegation ''That Defendant has 
discovered since the divorce Decree was entered on the 
24th day of June, 1954, that Plaintiff is earning and 
capable of earning in excess of $7,500.00 per year" (R. 
11), with no mention whatsoever as to what Appellant 
was making at the time the decree was entered. The 
reasonableness of the rule requiring specific allegations 
of a change of condition is readily apparent in this in-
~tance. Respondent had signed a joint income tax return 
with the Appellant within· approximately thirty days 
of the divorce Decree (R. 28) and thus knew full well 
what Appellant was making at the time of the Decree, 
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and that it was more than the income which she alleged 
in her Petition. If Respondent had clearly stated the 
facts relative to income both as to the time of divorce 
and the time of the requested Order to Show Cause, she 
would have been unable to secure the Order to Show 
Cause from the court, at least on that ground. 
It has long been the law in this state that a petition 
for modification of alimony or support awarded in a 
divorce decree must state facts sufficient to authorize 
its modification, as indicated in Chaffee vs. Chaffee, 63 
U. 261, 225 P. 76. 
In Cody v. Cody, 47 U. 456, 154 P. 952 at page 954 
in the Pacific Reporter, in regard to the interpretation 
of the statute whereby the court derives its power to 
modify a divorce decree, the court uses the following 
language: 
''Although the language is general in permit-
ting 'subsequent changes and new orders' to be 
made, yet we think it was not thereby intended 
that the courts could at any time review their own 
former orders or decrees respecting the allowance 
of alimony, etc. and are of the opinion that what 
was contemplated by the statute was that where 
a court had granted a decree of diYorce, and had 
allowed alimony, or had made distribution of 
property and disposal of children either party 
could thereafter come into court and allege that 
since the entry of the original decree material 
and permanent changes had taken place." 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING A 
~IODIFICATION OF THE DECREE OF DIVORCE 
SINCE THE EVIDENCE TAI\:EN AT THE HEAR-
I~G OF rrHE ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE DID NOT 
EST .. \BLISH A l\IATERIAL, SUBSTANTIAL OR 
PER~IANENT CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES 
SINCE THE DATE OF THE DECREE. 
Assuming for the purposes of this argument that 
Respondent had properly pleaded and alleged a change 
of circumstances, the record of the evidence taken at 
the hearing on the Order to Show Cause entirely fails 
to prove a change of conditions or circumstances author-
izing a modification of the decree of divorce. 
Although there were no pleadings to apprise the 
Appellant that he would have to meet a claim of increased 
income since the date of the divorce, the Respondent 
testified (R. 24) on direct examination: 
'' Q. Mrs. Carlton, since your divorce have 
you had occasion to examine Mr. Carlton's In-
come tax returns for the year 1954~ 
A. Yes, I saw them. 
Q. How much income did Mr. Carlton report 
for the year 1954 ~ 
A. Around $7,800.00. 
Q. $7 ,800.00. 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you know, Mrs. Carlton, how much he 
reported on for 1953 ~ 
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A. It was between $6,500 and $7 ,000.00." 
And again. on redirect examination (R. 31), the 
Respondent testified : 
'' Q. Do you recall how much the 1953 income 
tax showed he was making' 
A. No I don't. 
Q. Can you give us anything in regard to 
what it was' 
A. Between six and seven thousand dollars.'' 
The Appellant testified concerning his income (R. 
33) on direct examination as follows: 
"Q. Mr. Carlton there has been some testi-
mony here relative to the fact between 1953 and 
1954 you made more money, $800.00 more, or 
more than $800.00, will you please testify to the 
court as to your income in 1953, '54 and '55~ 
A. In 1954 I made approximately $1,200.00 
less than I did in 1953, which return :Mrs. Carlton 
signed. 
Q. $1,200.00 less? 
A. That is right. 
Q. And this year, what is it, just roughly can 
you estimate whether it is going to be more or 
less? 
A. It would be either the same or less than 
the 1954 - less than it was in 1954.'' 
Respondent above admits that she did not recall 
how much the 1953 income tax of Appellant showed, and 
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Now here else in the record do we find any attempt 
h~· the Respondent to prove a change of condition other 
than that the needs of the children were increasingly 
expensive, with no evidence as to particulars. 
'rhere is no question but that the law of this state 
is that a person who seeks to modify a decree of divorce 
must prove changed conditions arising since the entry 
of the decree. 
In the case of Hampton v. Hampton, 86 U. 570, 47 
P. 2d 419, at page 420 of the Pacific Reporter, the Court 
says: 
"It is well settled in this court that in order 
to secure a change in a decree for alimony the 
moving party must allege and prove changed 
conditions arising since the entry of the decree 
which require, under rules of equity and justice, 
a change in the decree. '' 
In the case of Jones L'. Jones, 104 U. 275, 139 P. 2d 
222, at page 224 in the Pacific Reporter, the Court quoteH 
with approval the above statement from the Hampton 
case and states : 
"There can be no doubt but what it 1s the 
settled law of this state." 
As stated in Barraclough v. Barraclough, 100 U. 196, 
111 P. 2d 792, the Court stated, on page 793 of the Pacific 
Reporter: 
''In order for appellant to be entitled to modi-
fication of the divorce decree as to alimony, she 
must allege and prove some change in circum-
stances on the part of either herself or the party 
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required to pay the alimony, justifying the court 
in modifying its decree.'' 
Also in the Barraclough case the Court quoted with 
approval the case of Langroll v. Langrall, 145 Md. 340, 
125 A. 695, as follows: 
''The amount of the alimony having been fixed 
by a formal decree of the court, in accordance 
with a definite agreement of the parties, a change 
in that determination should not be made except 
for clearly sufficient reasons. Our inquiry is not 
directed to a review of the original award, but is 
solely concerned with any difference between the 
present circumstances of the parties and those 
whirh existed when the decree for alimony was 
passed.'' 
The evidence given by the Respondent leaves no 
doubt that she was attempting to attack the reasonable-
ness of the original decree. It is the contention of the 
Appellant that the original decree of divorce is res 
judicata as to previous conditions authorizing alimony 
and support. The matter before the court is not whether 
the decree was right when entered because all presump-
tions are in its favor, but the question is, has the neces-
sity of the Respondent changed since the entry of the 
Decree, andjor has the ability of the Appellant to con-
tribute increased. \Ye submit that the Respondent failed 
entirely to meet this test in her evidence. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO 
MAI<E ANY FINDINGS OF FACT UPON WHICH 
10 
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lrt IT BASED ITS ORD_B~R MODIFYING THE DE-
CREE OF DIVORCE. 
i!~ The record is entirely devoid of findings of fact 
~I, from the evidence adduced from which the Court could 
justifiahly enter the Order Modifying the Decree of 
Divorce. It cannot be seriously contended that the fol-
lowing language by the Court in its Order (R. 43) con-
11" stitutes a finding: 
:i 
"Hereby ORDER, ADJUDGE AND DECREE 
as follows : 1. That there has been a change of 
circumstances of the parties since the 24th day 
of June, 1954, and that the court should modify 
the decree of court entered on the 24th day of 
June, 1954. '' 
Certainly the most that can be said for this statement 
is that it is a conclusion, and nowhere do we find any 
finding of fact upon which the court can base this con-
clusion. Of this the Supreme Court has said in Parish 
v. Parish, 84 U. 390, 35 P. 2d 999, at page 1,000 in the 
Pacific Reporter : 
,., A mere conclusion that the decree should or 
should not be modified, or that the eYidence is 
sufficient or insufficient to authorize relief, will 
not satisfy the requirements of the statute that 
the facts found must conform to the issues and be 
separately stated.'' 
In the case of Piper v. Eakle, 78 U. 342, 2 P. 2d 909, 
at page 910 in the Pacific Reporter the Court RayR: 
"It is the duty of the court to find upon all 
material issues raised by the pleadings, and the 
faiiure to do so is reversible error as has been 
· repeatedly held by this court.'' 
11 
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The failure of the court to make findings makes the 
position of the Appellant extremely difficult on appeal 
since he is left to 'guess' what issues or evidence he 
should stress in his brief. For the Appellant to have 
covered all of the pleadings and evidence would have 
violated the requirement of brevity and so the Appellant 
has chosen only those points that seem to warrant dis-
cussion. 
CONCLUSION 
It appears that what the lower court attempted to 
do in this case was to rewrite the original Decree more 
in conformity with what the court thought that the 
original Decree should have provided. Had the matter 
of the reasonableness of the original Decree been the 
issue before the Court, Appellant could and would have 
presented facts as to why the Appellant sought the 
Decree as it was written and why Respondent agreed to 
it in signing a Waiver and Entry of Appearance. How-
ever, the lower court did not have that prerogrative 
but as stated by the Supreme Court in Gale v. Gale, 258 
P. 2d 986: 
''The legal principle controlling in this case 
is that a divorce decree may not be modified 
unless it is alleged, proved and the trial court 
finds that the circumstances upon which it was 
based have undergone a substantial change.'' 
It is respectfully submitted that the Appellant 
failed to allege, failed to prove and the trial court failed 
to find the change of circumstances necessary to sub-
12 
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IW 
stantiate a Modification of the Divorce Decree, and, 
therefore, the trial court's Order should be annulled 
and the Decree as originally entered should be reinstated. 
Respectfully submitted, 
KING, ANDERSON & BROWN 
Attorneys for Appellant 
13 
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